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BOOK REVIEWS
By Beryl Harold
Levy. Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969.
Pp. xi, 365. $9.95.
CARDOZO AND

FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING.

This book, first published in 1938 when Justice Cardozo was still
alive, will serve to recall why so many people still talk of the HolmesBrandeis-Cardozo combination as the ideal of the American judiciary.
Unless preceded by an extensive study of legal trends and actual
decisions, it is difficult to speak with authority of the characteristics
and long range effects of a particular judge or court. The current
controversy over the Warren Court is evidence for this generalization.
In the case of Benjamin Cardozo, such an evaluation is made
easier by the judge's extra-legal writings: The Nature of the Judicial
Process (1921) and The Growth of the Law (1924). From these volumes
we know what the judge thought was his duty in deciding cases. As
Judge and Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals from 1917
to 1932, one of his primary objectives was to assist in the development
of a consistent and rounded body of law for the use of the people of
New York State. This inevitably involved the application of existing
law to new and unforseen economic and social situations.
It is the very idea of such an expansion of the frontiers of the
existing law that brings to mind the name of Cardozo. He had no
doubt that a judge must push ahead into new areas. A term like "strict
construction" could have little meaning or usefulness in his work. The
only real issue was one of pace. Hence the technical problem was
devising a method to accomplish this task without, for example,
throwing away the obvious advantages of consistency and uniformity.
Professor Levy's text is an analysis of Cardozo's method of
pushing into new areas or adjusting old rules to new social needs or
new conceptions of justice. The techniques so pithily stated by Cardozo
have been elaborated in subsequent decades, most notably by Karl
Llewellyn' and Julius Stone.2 But the more general account given by
the judge himself serves better to understand the problems of a judge
as they were in his day, as they are today, and as they will be so long
as men must judge in a world of change and what is deemed to be
progress.
Cardozo indicates four paths along which the directive force of a
I.

K.

2.

J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS (1964).

LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIONING: DECIDING APPEALS

(1960).
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legal principle may be advanced. These are the methods of philosophy
(symmetry), history, custom, and sociology (ethics).3 Philosophy for
the judge was merely the effort to make a rounded, coherent, orderly,
and logical whole out of the precedents and principles of law. If there
was to be a pushing out of the frontiers of the law, it was to be in the
terms of the existing body of law. The expansion was always to be
clearly in line with historical development with no quantum jumps; it
was to be in agreement with the customs of the community; and,
finally, it was to use the method of sociology to insure that any
development recognized the mores of the day, the present stage of
thinking in justice, morals, and social welfare.
To be a completely successful practitioner along all of these four
lines would be an extraordinary accomplishment. It is credible that an
exceptional intellect could so work with precedents and principles as to
evolve the necessary roundedness and consistency. Perhaps an adequate
library could provide the materials for keeping straight the line of
historical development. But consider how much more is necessary to
be in. tune with the customs of the times in all fields of law; consider
the antennae needed to reach out and touch the notions of justice,
morals, and social welfare likely to be the ones to prevail. The
continuing admiration for the work of Cardozo attests to the accepted
belief that .he, to an exceptional degree, encompassed the intellect,
factual knowledge, power of expression, and moral sensitivity necessary
to perform as he said a judge must.
It is of interest to note those issues on which Cardozo guessed
wrongly or missed what was to be the line of development. For
example, Professor Levy describes the long judicial .effort to undo the
Cardozo decision to exempt charitable hospitals from liability for the
negligent acts of their employees.'
In summary, it is suggested that the interested reader first read the
Cardozo opinions collected in Professor Levy's volume. These opinions
demonstrate how a great judge wraps up a case and the issues posed
in it. Then Cardozo's two previously cited volumes on how a judge
ought to perform should be read. These works together illustrate that
there is more to the business of law than triumphantly stating "it is
well established by a long line of cases, etc., etc." One would not
believe what a Cardozo can do with a long line of cases.
STANLEY
3.

B.

D.

ROSE*

30 (1921); B. LEVY, CARDOZO
(1969).
4. Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); B. LEVY, supra
note 3, at 321.
* Attorney, Civil Division, Department of Justice.
CARDOZO,
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CITY POLITICS AND PLANNING.

By Francine F. Rabinovitz. New York:

Atherton Press, Inc., 1969. Pp. 192. $6.95.
Any person who was privy to the cocktail conversation of planners
during the 1950's will be intrigued by Dr. Rabinovitz' competent
comment on planners in politics. Practitioners of the planner's art
were, during the 1940's and 1950's, examining, appraising, and
reappraising their relationship to the real world of decision making.
Uncertain of their professional identity, but certain that .they were
destined to play a major role in charting the courses of urban
development, this new breed of planning technician debated its
organizational position in the municipal scene and considered the
ethical issues of political involvement. Dr. Rabinovitz takes a careful
look at the whole problem of planners in politics and makes a
perceptive appraisal which is worth the reading time.
The analysis begins ,with an estimate of the planner's historical
notion that his role is that of a technician, preferably functioning as
an advisor to an independent commission. It describes an aloofness
from policy making and disinclination vigorously to "sell" planning
proposals in the political market place. The author concludes this
segment by observing that unless most communities are elitist, the
traditional technician's role, played in an independent organizational
setting, will not make planning effective.
The central theme of City Politics and Planning is that planning
effectiveness varies with the ability of the planner to recast his concepts
of role and to adjust his estimates of organization to fit the political
community in which he seeks to function. This premise is developed
through an assessment of planning programs in six municipalities. The
author detected four unlike political situations in these communities: a
cohesive system; an executive-centered system; a competitive system;
and a fragmented system. In each, the efficiency of the planner was
great or small, depending not upon a generalized notion of role or
organization, but upon an adaption of role and organization to the
characteristics of local politics.
Chapter V, captioned "Resources and Constraints," will be of
special interst to.persons seeking to guide a local planning program
from the printed brochure to practical implementation. It is an
inventory and estimate of the assets which a planner brings to the
political wars. Thus, his expertise-in reputation or in fact-may
insulate him from some lay criticism and may provide a technical mask
for some hard decisions. His information and his inventiveness may
give him a criticial edge. His bureaucratic position may furnish some
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leverage in political decision making. And his possession of time and
motivation may enable him to outlast his opposition. Against these
assets, of course, certain liabilities must be charged. Chief among these
is his lack of a constituency.
This interesting essay will undoubtedly inspire some introspection
and reappraisal by planners whose programs have languished. It will
give their cocktail conversations a new dimension. And it will spark
new insights in all who deal with planning and its practicing
professionls.
ROBERT

M. ANDERSON*

EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT,

THE

"CONSPIRACY

THEORY,"

AND

AMERICAN

By Howard Jay Graham. Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968. Pp. xiv, 631. $12.95.
CONSTITUTIONALISM.

Forged in the fierce heat of civil strife and political controversy,
the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution has remained
controversial for more than 100 years after its adoption. No provision
of the Constitution, including the commerce clause, has been so
productive of litigation, so stimulative to scholarly enquiry, and so
conducive to scholarly and judicial disagreement as the first and fifth
sections of the fourteenth amendment. Many years ago Edward S.
Corwin began his pioneering studies in due process of law,' but the task
of exploring the abolitionist origins and the legislative history of the
fourteenth amendment remained for and has been performed admirably
by the late Jacobus tenBroek in his provocative study, The Antislavery
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 and by Howard Jay Graham
in a notable series of articles which began in 1938 and continued
through 1964. Everyman's Constitution is primarily a collection of
these articles with introductory notes and two new chapters on frontier
tax titles and due process and equal protection.
The notable contributions of Mr. Graham's articles to
constitutional history are so great that it is surely no denigration of
*

Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.

1. These studies began with Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment,
7 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1909), and Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil
War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911); and culminated in E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST
GOVERNMENT (1948).
2. J. TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951).
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them to say that there is little that is new in Everyman's Constitution.
To provide scholars and libraries with these essays in one volume is
more than ample justification for their re-publication in book form.
The book begins with Mr. Graham's convincing refutation of the
"conspiracy" theory of the fourteenth amendment first enunciated by
Roscoe Conkling in his argument before the Supreme Court in San
Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R. 3 and accepted uncritically by
Charles A. and Mary R. Beard in 1927 in Rise of American
Civilization. The theory was that one of the major purposes of the first
section of the fourteenth amendment was the protection of corporations
and other business interests against hostile state legislation. After a
digression on Justice Stephen J. Field and the fourteenth amendment,
the author returns to the anti-slavery background of the amendment to
argue persuasively for affirmative due process and affirmative equal
protection. The theme of this argument is that the abolitionist views
of due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities of
citizens point to the conclusion that the equal rights of all persons must
be positively protected by the government. Behind the demands of
abolitionists like John A. Bingham, who wrote most of the first section,
was the intent to endow the federal government with the power to
enforce rights deemed immanent within the Declaration of
Independence and the Bill of Rights. In his subsequent discussion of
the fourteenth amendment and segregated education, the author is
equally explicit in arguing that the prohibition against the denial of
equal protection of the laws imposes a positive duty on the states to
provide full and equal protection to all persons within their jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it is Mr. Graham's conviction, fortified by historical
evidence, that many constitutional cases, like the Slaughter-House
Cases,4 the Civil Rights Cases,5 and Plessy v. Ferguson,6 were wrongly
decided and that decisions of the Supreme Court since 1954 are more
nearly in accord with the Constitution both with respect to the meaning
of the first section of the fourteenth amendment and the power of
Congress to enforce it under section five.
The author's meticulous collection and presentation of evidence
and his thorough attention to every detail of scholarship combined with
the nature of the work as a compilation render an adequate summary
impossible. Nonetheless, the volume has a persistent theme which is
3.
4.
5.
6.

116 U.S. 138 (1882).
83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36 (1873).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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best expressed in the author's statement that what the United States
under the guarantee of due process, equal protection, and privileges and
immunities has done for corporations, "it can and must do for itself,
and for still disadvantaged minorities, using the same techniques and
weapons, and in this case, intended process and protection [and] ...
provide for others what others provided for them-economic
opportunity, the protection of law, and the opportunity to realize to the
full their inherent capacity and potential. ' 7 As a consequence,
Everyman's Constitution has fewer infirmities than most compilations
of previously published essays, and it would be querulous to complain
of the repetitious, and, at times, irrelevant nature of portions of a work
which is one of the best histories of the origins and early history of the
fourteenth amendment.
ROBERT J. HARRIS*

THE IMPACT OF NEGRO VOTING: THE ROLE OF THE VOTE IN THE QUEST

By William R. Keech. Chicago: Rand McNally,
American Politics Research Series, 1968. Pp. ix, 113. $3.95.
FOR

EQUALITY.

One of the historic changes in modern American democracy has
been the extension of the suffrage to the Southern Negro. As V.0.
Key's classic Southern Politics ably demonstrated more than two
decades ago, the exclusion of the Southern black from the ballot was
a basic tenet of the traditional Southern political system. Key
compared the relationship of the Southern white, especially in the
Black Belt, with that of the Dutch in the West Indies and the British
in India during the heyday of colonialism. In the decades since the
Second World War much has changed, abroad and in the Old South.
In the modernizing process the Southern Negro has gained
considerable access to the ballot.
Key's analysis of Southern politics still stands as a classic in
modern American political science. But he wrote at a time prior to the
great changes that have swept the South in the 1950's and 1960's. Since
Key's work, only a few book length studies focusing on the Negro in
Southern politics have been published. The authors include: Hugh
Doublas Price, Donald Matthews and James W. Prothro, Everett CarlI
Ladd, Donald Strong, this reviewer, and now William R. Keech.
7.
*

H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION ix (1968).
James Hart Professor ot Government and Professor of History, University of Virginia.
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The perspective from which Keech begins is democratic theory.
Voting is widely celebrated as fundamental to democracy, but the
Southern Negro was long excluded from this privilege. What happens
when this group gains access to the ballot? The subject is obviously
important, and the South offers an excellent opportunity to explore it.
Furthermore, Keech wanted to undertake more than the usual voting
study with the emphasis, typically, on why people voted as they did.
Instead, the author argues for a focus on the impact, the effects, and
the policy outcomes. If voting is as important as democratic theory
would have us believe, then it should make a real difference. The vote
should bring benefits of some kind to those previously excluded. But
what kind of benefits? And how would one measure them?
The author's approach is to examine closely two Southern
communities: Durham, North Carolina, and Tuskegee, Alabama. The
focus lies on the role of the Negro electorate and the payoffs achieved
by the electoral process for each Negro community. The two opening
,chapters of the book deal with democratic theory, political science, and
the setting and method. Succeeding chapters analyze the operation of
the Negro electorate in each community, the payoffs in the public
sector, the payoffs in the private sector, and, finally, the conclusions
and implications of the study.
The author's findings, as he states them, offer limited comfort to
those who see salvation in the vote. The vote can accomplish some
things but has its limitations even where, as in Tuskegee, blacks became
a majority in 1964. In Durham where they comprised about a third of
the total population their "really striking gains" came through
resources other than votes (p. 105). The vote was best at producing
incremental changes that altered discriminatory application of the law,
especially in its crudest and most blatant forms. The vote was less
effective in bringing about whole new programs and especially those
that involved integration and the private sector, particularly housing.
Above all, the vote was not effective in attacking the effects of past
discrimination. Although the author attributes some of the last to lack
of knowledge of how to cope with such problems, he also attributes this
result to opposition from whites who see such programs as a favoring
of the Negro.
A study such as this certainly is welcome and all the more so since
the author sought to determine the effects of the vote. In the jargon of
the trade these days, he was looking for "outputs" as well as "inputs."
What he has to say is well organized, to the point, and well written.
There are, however, some weaknesses. Chiefly the book reflects a

482
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narrow and almost mechanistic approach to the democratic process. If
one may reasonably view the South in the traditional-to-modernizing
perspective suggestedy V.0. Key's comparisons with colonial areas
and by others since (including this reviewer), then far-reaching change
has overtaken the region. Is it conceptually wise or desirable to try to
isolate the Negro vote alone to study its impact? The author himself
admits that this is a problem.
Certainly the fundamental factor in this changing Southern scene
would seem to be the growing participation of the Negro and the
variety of forms, including direct action, that it has taken. The results
may not be adequately measured in candidates elected, streets paved,
and new programs instituted for the poor. One early and important
change may be a reduction in the climate of fear that so many
Southern Negroes experienced, and just having the right to vote,
whether one exercises it or not, matters some. To be a part of a
participant political culture in the sense Gabriel Almond and Sidney
Verba analyzed it in their book, The Civic Culture, means a good deal
more than policy outputs that relate directly to votes.
Next, what of the whole matter of outputs or payoffs as the issue
has been posed by some militants? In their eyes the real payoff should
be the achievement of substantial equality, economically and socially,
here and now. They are not concerned, apparently, as to whether they
get their results through action by local, state, or federal officials or
by those who are elected, appointed or who happen to be in the private
sector. The author's analysis tends to confine itself to elected local
government officials. This emphasis is not surprising for a political
scientist, although he does recognize in some degree these non-local and
non-governmental influences. But the focus on the electoral process and
its impact necessarily casts into the background outputs of various
kinds from other sources.
In the end, much of the criticism amounts to an attack on what
the author set out to do. He set a limited objective which he has
executed in a clear, well-organized, coherent manner. In this sense what
he has done is a good beginning; the author himself would probably
agree that much more remains to be done.
HARRY HOLLOWAY*
*

Professor of Political Science, University of Oklahoma.
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By Herbert L. Packer.
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1968. Pp. xi, 385. $8.95.
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION.

In The Liuits of the Criminal Sanction Herbert L. Packer,
Professor of Law at Stanford University, argues forcefully that doubt
concerning purported -justifications for punishment and the
cumbersome nature of safeguards necessary to protect the individual
defendant render the criminal process a frequently inexpedient means
of social control. He would restrict its application to situations
satisfying at least six conditions (p. 296):
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

The conduct is prominent in most people's view of socially threatening
behavior, and is not condoned by any significant segment of society.
Subjecting it to the criminal sanction is not inconsistent with the goals
of punishment.
Surpressing it will not inhibit socially desirable conduct.
It may be dealt with through even-handed and nondiscriminatory
enforcement.
Controlling it through the criminal process will not expose that process
to severe qualitative or quantitative strains.
There are no reasonable alternatives to the criminal sanction for dealing
with it.

Particular hostility, the author points out, is shown toward
institutionalized harassment of drunks, addicts, prostitutes, and
homosexuals, many of whom are often unable to purchase protection
and whose actions cause little harm to others but merely transgress
formal behavioral norms. Attempts to regulate the trivial or the*
inherently uncontrollable are disparaged as unnecessary and damaging
to the prestige of the law.' The author stresses that official inaction,
currently a fortuitous consequence of limited funding and only
tenuously linked to a conscious commitment to nonenforcement of
legislated standards, is in many cases a viable alternative to present
practices. Discussion of criminal procedure contrasts a Crime Control
Model, characterized by the overriding importance of repression of
criminal conduct, with a Due Process Model, where emphasis is placed
on avoidance of error. Given a budget constraint, the former approach
would seek to maximize the number of guilty punished, while the latter
would attempt to minimize the number of innocent wrongly convicted.
The second goal must necessarily be qualified by a required minimum
1. In illustration,
punishment of smoking
apt example is perhaps
simply, 'It is forbidden

(1968).

Packer offers an ordinance of the New York City Council authorizing
in bed with a fine of $100, a jail sentence of 30 days, or both. A more
provided by "the notice of the Yorkshire moors which announced, quite
to throw stones at this notice.'" D. FROST & A. JAY, THE ENGLISH 133
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level of repressive activity: utter inaction appears the only certain way
to avoid error. The posited dichotomy thus focuses attention on the
to incur
cost in terms of incorrect convictions which society is willing
2
offenders.
of
proportions
various
of
to achieve the punishment
These polar models provide a useful framework for analysis by the
author of problems involving arrests for investigation, electronic
eavesdropping, the sanction for illegally secured evidence, access to
counsel, pretrial detention, guilty pleas, the right to collateral attack,
and retroactivity in the application of changed procedural norms.
Packer argues that in practice the criminal process generally
approximates the Crime Control Model. Although he applauds efforts
by the Supreme Court to alter this approach, he is concerned that
recent judicial advances are frequently ignored by police and
prosecutors and may be abrogated not only by explicit rejection at the
highest level but also by a diminished willingness to continue scrutiny
of enforcement activities.
Protests against the harshness of the criminal process and its
consequences frequently dissipate their force in intellectually contentless
emotive outbursts, argumentative ideological explications, or tortuous
analyses from constitutional postulates.3 Packer, however, supports his
conclusions by dispassionately demonstrating the inadequacy of
traditional, justifications for punishment given modern ethical and
scientific standards. As he indicates, even recent criminological studies
have been unable to carry debate over premises very far beyond the
speculative level; indeed many such efforts appear little more
convincing than Boosie's work with cats:
Boosie in 1948 studied the behavior of cats in an aqueous environment. Typically,

a cat which is confined to a cage totally immersed in water exhibits an initial
period of disorganized, apparently random action, involving great muscular
activity. This pattern of behavior ceases, often quite abruptly, when the animal
discovers that a state of reduced energy expenditure permits cessation of

respiratory activity. That learning, in fact, takes place is unquestionable, since
2.

See Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion

Practicesin CriminalCases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 881-82 (1968).
3. Examples of the last approach may tend toward the scholastic: "Unless it can be
seriously urged that denying unemployment benefits to a Sabbatarian who refuses to work on
Saturdays is a greater infringement of right to free exercise of religion than is execution of a felon
who is or who might otherwise become religious, Sherbert demands that a state demonstrate that
capital punishment serves a compelling state interest which 'alternative forms' of punishment
could not serve while permitting a felon the free exercise of religion for the remainder of his
natural life. Since no state can demonstrate that any legitimate state interest is more adequately
served by the death penalty than by life imprisonment with possibility of parole, no court could
legitimately sustain capital punishment." Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REv.
1268, 1363 (1968).
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presentation of further stimuli do not cause the animal to return to its initial active
(and ill-adapted) condition.4

Packer asserts that H.L.A. Hart's definition of punishment as
intentional infliction of pain by a legally constituted authority on a
supposed offender against legal rules is incomplete without the addition
of a teleological term.. He notes that the criminal process has
traditionally implemented demands for retribution: punishment was
characterized by suffering imposed upon those whose disapproved
conduct demanded expiation or aroused a community craving for
revenge.' The "utilitarian or preventive position" is advanced as
usually in opposition to the retributive approach (p. 39):
Its premise is that punishment, as an infliction of pain, is unjustifable unless it
can be shown that more good is likely to result from inflicting than from
withholding it. The good that is thought to result from punishing criminals is the
prevention or reduction of a greater evil, crime. There are many different, and
often inconsistent, ways in which punishment may prevent the commission of
crimes, but the inconsistencies should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the
desired result is the same in every case.

Dissatisfied with any unitary rationale, Packer proposes (p. 62):
(1) It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for punishment that it is
designed to prevent the commission of offenses.
(2) It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of punishment that the person
on whom it is imposed is found to have committed an offense under circumstances that permit his conduct to be characterized as blameworthy.

The obvious acceptability of preventive criteria as at least a partial
basis for punishment leads the author to defend his position primarily
by attempting to demonstrate that these alone are insufficient.
Preventive measures may deter, incapacitate, or rehabilitate.
Punishment can discourage unlawful conduct not only by rendering it
Cadwallader-Cohen, Zysiczk & Donnelly, The Chaostron, in A STRESS ANALYSIS OF A
AGE 139, 140 (R. Baker editor,
Anchor edition 1969).
5. Such reasoning excludes the possibility that attribution of guilt has at times been a
selection process subordinated to the goal of legitimated injury. Huizinga, discussing punishment
during the middle ages, states: "Torture and executions are enjoyed by the spectators like an
entertainment at a fair. The citizens of Mons bought a brigand, at far too high a price, for the
pleasure of seeing him quartered, 'at which the people rejoiced more than if a new holy body had
risen from the dead.' The people of Bruges, in 1488, during the captivity of Maximilian, King of
the Romans, cannot get their fill of seeing the tortures inflicted, on a high platform in the middle
of the market-place, on the magistrates suspected of treason. The unfortunates are refused the
deathblow which they implore, that the people may feast again upon their torments. . . . The
chronicler Pierre de Fenin, having described the death of a gang of brigans, winds up naively:
'and people laughed a good deal, because they were all poor men."' J. HUIZINGA, THE WANING
OF THE MIDDLE AGES 15, 17 (1924). See Jackson, The Lottery, in THE MAGIC OF SHIRLEY
JACKSON 137 (S. Hyman ed. 1966).
4.

STRAPLESS EVENING GOWN AND OTHER ESSAYS FOR A SCIENTIFIC
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prospectively unprofitable to the amoral individual but also by serving
as a sign of societal disapproval which may activate in others
nonrational internal controls primarily dependent on learned responses
of guilt or shame. Its impact, however, has not yet been reliably
quantified. Special deterrence or intimidation is felt discredited by rates
of reconviction as high as 50 percent which appear positively correlated
with the severity of the prior punishment. That incarceration restricts
the criminal activity of those currently confined generally cannot alone
justify such a sanction: less oppressive safeguards will often preclude
recidivism, while life imprisonment where only minor violations are
anticipated might appear warranted given incorrigibility. Rehabilitative'
treatment, defined to include the prefrontal lobotomy, would, even if
highly successful, raise problems concerning the propriety of actions by
the state to restructure the personalities of its citizens. Summarizing,
Packer states (p. 63):
Deterrence

. .

. is the only goal we can accept in advance for punishing all crimes

committed by all persons, without scrutinizing the facts of the particular case in
which punishment may be imposed. Yet acceptance of its existence, let alone its
efficacy, involves a leap of faith. Incontrast, intimidation, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation are all partial and fragmentary goals, and their relevance in any
given case is always at issue. Although it is easier to make an empirical assessment

of their effectiveness than to do the same for deterrence, they involve difficult
moral puzzles, central among which is: what is the calculus by which one
determines whether punishment in their name serves or disserves even the limited
goals of crime prevention, let alone the range of goals that a legal system is
designed to achieve?

Unaugmented utilitarian premises are thought insufficient to
motivate current practices. That application of sanctions must today
almost invariably be justified by proof of previously proscribed conduct
on the part of the accused is advanced as the most important restriction
on the criminal law as "purely the servant of the utilitarian ideal of
prevention" (p. 76). Packer posits that incarceration based on
prediction of future illicit conduct might more effectively limit criminal
activity. Excuse doctrines are likewise believed evidence of divergence
from the utilitarian paradigm. Their existence is felt to offer
opportunities for deception; in addition, and less convincingly, Packer
argues that, for example, "there is nothing about the fortuity of
homicide in self-defense that demonstrates lack of dangerousness" (p.
S111). He concludes (pp. 112-13):
The reasons for recognizing excuses do not . . . have much to do with the
prevention of antisocial conduct. They have to do with other values that, to put
it bluntly, interfere with absolute efficiency in the prevention of antisocial
conduct. . . . [lI]t is a matter of judgment whether the utilitarian losses that
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inevitably attend the recognition of an excuse are outweighed by the gain in
freedom from state intervention ....

Although Packer is not alone in urging that punishment can be
justified only when both retributive and utilitarian prerequisites are
satisfied,6 his rejection of a purely utilitarian standard appears a
consequence of the narrowness with which he defines it. Equating the
utilitarian with the preventive contradicts rather than implements the
utilitarian model. Community well-being is not solely a function of the
level of criminal activity; if it were, maximization would entail
ludicrously rigorous controls or-from a semantic perspectiveelimination of the concept of crime. Competing values, such as the
right to privacy and other aspects of individual liberty, are also vital
to utilitarian calculations. Packer employs retributive restraints to
balance these diverse claims so as to achieve what he considers the
greatest good. Modest changes in terminology would have permitted
him to reach identical conclusions without contesting the universality of
utilitarian principles.
The utilitarian ideal as correctly applied to the criminal process
is more vulnerable to criticism as a spurious exercise in abstract selfrighteousness by a bourgeoisie which, like its modern counterpart,
realistically expected the sanctions it established to be used almost
exclusively against the lower orders. From this point of view the
retributive standard appears indispensable to utilitarian goals: since in
general it is not the purpose of the criminal law to regulate the behavior
of the middle class, its members should value highly the security
provided by assurances that only offenders will be punished.7 Avenues
of attack alternative to the Marxist polemic similarly beckon.
Utilitarian responses to criticism may have so generalized the root
concept as to render it almost meaningless;' moreover, remaining
content cannot escape condemnation by the less materialistic:
Suppose that it were discovered that a state of pleasure is always associated with
a particular kind of space-time pattern of electromagnetic field, or other physical
system, and that we were capable of producing such patterns in the
laboratory. . . . Would we be justified in spending a large part of the world's
resources in producing pleasure-fields of high intensity? . . . Should we breed
billions of rats and supply them each with a pleasure-producing machine?. . . The
absurdity of such a scheme, either for rats or for people, seems to constitute a
common-sense refutation of altruistic hedonism.9
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In the fifth century B.C., Hippondamus of Miletus "held that
there were but three kinds of laws, as the possible subjects of judicial
procedure were- but three, namely, assault, trespass and homicide.'"
Nearly one third of the five million arrests in the United States during
1965 were for drunkenness; an additional one sixth were for other
victimless crimes or breaches of the peace."1 That the criminal process
is currently inappropriately employed to control conduct which should
be either left unregulated or regulated by other means appears
unquestionable. Packer convincingly presents the case for restriction
and reform. Bentham would have concurred:
With what. chance of success . . .would a legislator go about to extirpate
drunkenness and fornication by dint of legal punishment? Not all the tortures
which ingenuity could invent would compass it: and, before he had made any
progress ,worth regarding, such a mass of evil would be produced by the
punishment, as would exceed, a thousandfold, the utmost possible mischief of the
2
offence.'
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